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Labelling IDS Clusters by Means of the Silhouette Index
Abstract. One of the most difficult problems in the design of an anomaly based
intrusion detection system (IDS) that uses clustering is that of labelling the ob-
tained clusters, i.e. determining which of them correspond to ”good” behaviour
on the network/host and which to ”bad” behaviour. In this paper, a new clusters’
labelling strategy, which makes use of the Silhouette clustering quality index is
proposed for application in such an IDS. The aim of the new labelling algorithm
is to detect compact clusters containing very similar vectors and these are highly
likely to be attack vectors. The effectiveness of a multiple classifier IDS with the
Silhouette index implemented is compared to the effectiveness of a system em-
ploying a classical cardinality-based labelling strategy. Experimental results show
that the system using the Silhouette index produces much more accurate results
than the system that uses the classical cardinality-based labelling. Possibilities of
improving the overall efficiency of an IDS using the new labelling algorithm are
also discussed.
Key words: Intrusion detection system, Anomaly detection, Clustering, Silhou-
ette index.
1 Introduction
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are security tools designed to detect and classify at-
tacks against computer networks and hosts. They can operate in two ways: either by
searching for specific patterns in data (misuse based IDS) or by recognising certain
deviations from expected behaviour (anomaly based IDS). In anomaly based IDS, clus-
tering algorithms are often used for recognition of ”abnormal” behaviour, especially if
many previously unknown attacks appear on the monitored network/host [12]. They can
be applied either directly on incoming data [4, 7, 17] or as a supporting technique in a
stage posterior to data classification performed by means of other techniques [10, 21].
Anomaly based IDS classify input data into a number of categories, or classes. This
number can be arbitrary, but as the essential goal of these systems is to distinguish
between ”normal” and ”abnormal” behaviour, it is very common to partition the in-
coming resource access requests into two classes that correspond to these two types of
behaviour. The data are submitted to the system in the form of lists created at predefined
time intervals or alternatively, upon a predefined number of incoming requests. Then the
system makes the decision about whether abnormal behaviour occurred or not, based
on the obtained classification results.
In this paper, we consider a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack scenario in which attack
resource access requests arrive to the monitored network/host in bursts. An anomaly
based IDS analyzes N resource access requests at a time and if it detects that more
than N/2 of these requests correspond to attacks then it should generate a special alert.
We call such a scenario a massive attack. Sometimes, other network monitoring tools
(e.g. firewalls) can detect such attacks, but the advantage of an anomaly based IDS
regarding all kinds of attacks (including massive attacks as defined in this paper) is in
the capability of detecting a completely new attack.
If clustering is used for classification of resource access requests in an IDS, the
main problem is the interpretation of clustering results, so called ”labelling” of clusters.
Namely, without additional information it is difficult to decide whether the data clas-
sified in one cluster correspond to ”normal” behaviour in the monitored network or to
”abnormal” behaviour. Cardinalities of clusters are often used as a decision parameter
for this purpose (see, for example, [17]) because the mathematical expectation of ”nor-
mal” behaviour is considered greater than that of ”abnormal” behaviour. However, this
approach fails to detect massive attacks. Solving this problem requires a more complex
clusters’ labelling algorithm. A labelling strategy capable of outperforming the clusters’
cardinality based labelling strategy has been proposed and analyzed in [16].
We analyze an alternative clusters’ labelling strategy based on application of the
Silhouette clustering evaluation index and clusters’ silhouettes [18]. The goal of such a
combination is to respond adequately to the properties of attack vectors. We consider
the compactness of the corresponding clusters and the separation between them the
principal parameters that distinguish ”normal” from ”abnormal” behaviour in the anal-
ysed network. The Silhouette index takes into account these parameters and because
of that we apply it in our IDS. In the experiments, we test the response of a multiple
classifier IDS (see, for example, [5]) with the new labelling strategy to artificial data.
We express the IDS quality through Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves.
The effectiveness of the IDS that uses the Silhouette index is compared with that of a
system that uses a classical cardinality-based labelling algorithm.
In the experiments, we tested our labelling algorithm on the well known KDD CUP
1999 artificial data set [3, 11], which was used as the traffic source. Although this source
has been criticized in the literature (see, for example, [13, 20]), it is still being used for
IDS benchmarking [1, 6, 15]. We found it convenient as a source of massive attacks,
against which we have tested our labelling strategy. The experimental results show that
the labelling strategy that uses the Silhouette index gives much more accurate results
than the strategy that employs the classical cardinality-based labelling, especially if
massive attacks are present in the input data.
The problem of application of the Silhouette index labelling in an IDS is in its
computational complexity, which is quadratic in the number of vectors involved in the
clustering. However, by reducing the number of analyzed vectors at a time, it is possible
to improve the overall efficiency of an IDS using such labelling.
The structure of the paper is the following: In Section 2, a general description of the
analyzed intrusion detection system is given. In Section 3, the new clusters’ labelling
method employing the Silhouette clustering quality index is described in detail. In Sec-
tion 4, the experimental work is described and the results of the experiments are given.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 General description of the system
The multiple classifier IDS, whose elements we analyze in this paper, consists of the
following components (Fig. 1):
1. K sensors, P1, . . .PK, which operate in parallel on the same data set Xτ , τ =
0, 1, 2, . . . We limit ourselves to the case in which every sensor is merely a cluster-
ing algorithm that classifies the input data set into K clusters, without any interpre-
tation of clustering results.
2. L assessors, A1, . . . ,AL, whose task is to ”label” the clusters obtained from the
sensors, upon processing the current data set Xτ . For this to be carried out, every
assessor calculates the value of its own criterion function for every sensor over
the data set Xτ . A local extreme value (maximum or minimum) of this function
determines the decision of the assessor on the following: an element of Xτ belongs
to a cluster that is interpreted as one of the ”normal” clusters or it belongs to a
cluster that is interpreted as an ”abnormal” one.
3. The manager of the system adjusts the parameters of the sensors and the assessors
in order to maximize the effectiveness of the system as a whole.
Fig. 1 - A multiple classifier IDS
In this paper, we concentrate on the basic sensor-assessor structure. The former
actually performs the clustering of the incoming resource access requests, whereas the
latter performs the clustering quality evaluation.
We have selected the well known K-means algorithm (see for example [9]) for
implementation in the sensors of the IDS, because we consider this algorithm the best
trade-off between accuracy and efficiency. The K-means algorithm is presented in the
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 - The K-means algorithm
The input resource access requests are encoded in such a way that vectors of the
same length are produced. The Euclidean metric, given by the following expression, is
used in our system as a distance measure between vectors.
d(X,Y) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
| xi − yi |2 (1)
where n is the dimension of the vectors X and Y.
3 The clusters’ labelling algorithm
Having obtained clusters from the sensors, the task of the assessors is to label them, i.e.
to determine which clusters correspond to ”normal” behaviour, and which to ”abnor-
mal” behaviour. Since there is no learning on labelled data in the system, the assessors
must use other criteria to decide on this. A common assumption is that few anomalies
are expected in the clustering results, so a significant difference in cardinalities of the
clusters naturally labels the cluster with the greatest cardinality as that corresponding to
”normal” behaviour. However, there are at least two problems related to such a strategy
[17]: first, normal data transmitted by means of a less frequently used protocol (such as
ftp or telnet) might produce clusters of very different cardinalities, which could mislead
such an assessor. Second, there are some Denial-of-Service attacks, such as syn-Flood,
that can mislead this labelling strategy by making the mathematical expectation of the
attack much greater than that of a ”normal” behaviour. To overcome the problems re-
lated to the labelling strategy described above, we propose the Silhouette clustering
evaluation index to be used in the assessors of the IDS. This index opts for detecting
well separated and compact clusters.
In our IDS assessing algorithm, the global Silhouette index of the clustering is com-
bined with the comparison of the silhouettes of the clusters. We now present the formal
definition of the Silhouette index.
Let Xτ = {X1, . . . ,XN} be the data set and let C = (C1, . . . , CK) be its clus-
tering into K clusters. Let d(Xk,Xl) be the distance between Xk and Xl. Let Cj =
{Xj
1
, . . . ,Xjmj} be the j-th cluster, j = 1, . . . ,K , where mj =| Cj |. The average
distance aji between the i-th vector in the cluster Cj and the other vectors in the same
cluster is given by the following expression [2, 8, 18]:
aji =
1
mj − 1
mj∑
k=1
k 6=i
d(Xji ,X
j
k), i = 1, . . . ,mj . (2)
The minimum average distance between the i-th vector in the cluster Cj and all the
vectors clustered in the clusters Ck, k = 1, . . . ,K , k 6= j is given by the following
expression:
bji = min
n=1,...,K
n6=j
{
1
mn
mn∑
k=1
d(Xji ,X
n
k )
}
, i = 1, . . . ,mj . (3)
Then the silhouette width of the i-th vector in the cluster Cj is defined in the follow-
ing way:
sji =
bji − a
j
i
max
{
aji , b
j
i
} (4)
From the expression (4), it follows that −1 ≤ sji ≤ 1. We can now define the
silhouette of the cluster Cj :
Sj =
1
mj
mj∑
i=1
sji (5)
Finally, the global Silhouette index of the clustering is given by:
S =
1
K
K∑
j=1
Sj (6)
It is easy to see that both a cluster’s silhouette and the global silhouette take values
between -1 and 1 (both inclusive).
In the experiments, we compare the results obtained with our assessing algorithm
with the results obtained with the clusters’ cardinalities criterion, a common measure for
assessing IDS clusters (see for example [17]). We define this criterion in the following
way:
Let Xτ = {X1, . . . ,XN} be the current data set and let Ck,τ = {Yk,τ ,Zk,τ} be
the partition of Xτ into 2 clusters, obtained in the sensor Pk. Let λj ∈ {1, 2} be the
label of the vector Xj in the data set Xτ , where λj = 1 is interpreted as ”normal”
behaviour. If | Yk,τ |≥| Zk,τ | +DC , where DC is a threshold given in advance then
λj = 1 for Xj ∈ Yk,τ and λj = 2 otherwise. If | Zk,τ |≥| Yk,τ | +DC , then λj = 1
for Xj ∈ Zk,τ and λj = 2 otherwise.
For the remainder of this paper, we shall limit ourselves to studying the case with 2
clusters, of which one corresponds to ”normal” and the other to ”abnormal” behaviour
in the corresponding network. The reason for this is that, whatever the number of clus-
ters we use in the sensors, we must finally decide which of them will be considered
”normal”, leading us to a case with 2 ”superclusters”.
The main idea of our clusters’ labelling algorithm, which uses the Silhouette clus-
tering quality index is the following:
The attack vectors are often mutually very similar, if not identical. Because of that,
we expect that the attack cluster in the case of a massive attack will be extremely com-
pact. The value of the Silhouette index of such a clustering is either 1 or very close to
1. Having in mind the expected mutual similarity among attack vectors, the silhouette
of the attack cluster is expected to be greater than the silhouette of the non-attack clus-
ter. The case in which one of the clusters is empty must be treated in a special way:
since the Silhouette index is used, relabeling of the clustering should be performed if
the value of the global Silhouette index is -1 and the cluster labelled with ”2” (the label
reserved for the attack cluster) is empty. Higher values of the global Silhouette index
indicate the presence of a massive attack, whereas higher values of clusters’ silhouettes
indicate attack clusters.
By contrast, when the global Silhouette index takes lower values, i.e. when there is
no massive attack, the silhouette of the non attack cluster (labelled with ”1”) is expected
to be higher than the silhouette of the attack cluster (labelled with ”2”). This is because
isolated attacks (non-massive) are expected to be less similar among themselves.
Example 1: In the KDD CUP 1999 data set, many attack vectors correspond to the
so called ”smurf” attack, which is a sort of DoS attack. Table 1 shows the differences
between the coordinates of two attack vectors that correspond to the ”smurf” attack.
Table 2 shows the differences between two ”normal” vectors. In this particular example
it is easy to see that the difference between two attack vectors is much smaller than the
difference between two ”normal” vectors.
The study above gives rise to the following labelling algorithm:
Algorithm 1 - the Silhouette index labelling algorithm
Input:
– A clustering C of N vectors into 2 clusters, C1 and C2, in which the vectors as-
signed to the ”non-attack” cluster C1 take the label ”1”, and those assigned to the
”attack” cluster C2 take the label ”2”.
– The global Silhouette index threshold, ∆S .
– The clusters’ silhouette thresholds, ∆S1 and ∆S2 .
Output:
– The eventually relabelled input clustering, if relabelling conditions are met.
begin
S ←− GlobalSilhouetteIndex(C) ;
s1 ←− Silhouette(C1) ;
s2 ←− Silhouette(C2) ;
/** Condition 1 **/
if (S = −1) and (IsEmpty(C2)) then
Relabel(C)
/** Condition 2 **/
else if (S < ∆S) and (s1 < s2 +∆S1) then
Relabel(C)
/** Condition 3 **/
else if (S > ∆S) and (s1 +∆S2 > s2) then
Relabel(C) ;
end.
The relabelling procedure is given below:
procedure Relabel(Clustering C)
begin
forall vectors in C
if label of a vector is ’1’, set it to ’2’
and vice versa ;
end.
Example 2: The Algorithm 1 applied to the first 20000 records of the reduced (10%)
KDD CUP data set, upon clustering by the 2-means algorithm where N = 1000,
produces no labelling errors in spite of a very bad as-clustered labelling on average.
The parameters of the Algorithm 1 are the following: ∆S = 0.8, ∆S1 = 0.0001 and
∆S2 = 0.0001. The results are summarized in the Table 3.
Table 1. The differences between two attack vectors in the KDD CUP 1999
data base (records 7635 and 7636 of the reduced (10%) data set). The rest of
41 coordinates are equal to 0.
Coord. id. Rec. 7635 Rec. 7636
protocol type 2 2
service 50001 50001
flag 10 10
src bytes 1032 1032
count 511 511
srv count 511 511
same srv rate 100 100
dst host count 228 238
dst host srv count 83 93
Table 2. The differences between two ”normal” vectors in the KDD CUP data
base (records 6 and 7 of the reduced (10%) data set). The rest of 41 coordinates
are equal to 0.
Coord. id. Rec. 6 Rec. 7
service 80 80
flag 10 10
src bytes 212 159
dst bytes 1940 4087
logged in 1 1
count 1 5
srv count 2 5
same srv rate 100 100
srv diff host rate 100 0
dst host count 1 11
dst host srv count 69 79
dst host same srv rate 100 100
dst host same src port rate 100 0
Table 3. Application of the Algorithm 1 to the first 20000 records of the
reduced (10%) KDD CUP 1999 data set. The first row of the table corre-
sponds to the records 1-1000 of the KDD CUP 1999 data base, the second
row corresponds to the records 1001-2000 and so on.
S s1 s2 No. of Relab.
index attacks cond.∗
0.611 0.368 0.854 0 2
0.663 0.482 0.845 0 2
0.678 0.503 0.853 0 2
0.666 0.403 0.93 2 2
0.499 0.089 0.908 0 2
0.643 0.828 0.459 0 0
0.661 0.958 0.364 0 0
0.956 0.999 0.913 376 3
-1.0 -1.0 e 1000 1
-1.0 -1.0 e 1000 1
-1.0 -1.0 e 1000 1
0.953 0.998 0.907 321 3
0.582 0.290 0.875 0 2
0.627 0.863 0.391 0 0
0.568 0.160 0.977 0 2
0.589 0.428 0.750 21 2
0.614 0.397 0.831 0 2
0.592 0.849 0.335 0 0
0.621 0.356 0.885 0 2
0.945 0.895 0.995 99 0
∗ See Algorithm 1; 0 means that the initial (as clustered) labelling is correct so no relabelling is
performed by the Algorithm 1
e Empty cluster
The behaviour of the Algorithm 1 depends on the choice of the parameters. These
should be determined in advance. One of the ways to do that is to use a network/dataset
with known relevant characteristics, of which the most important ones are the base
rate, i.e. the probability of the attack and the type of the attack. For example, the KDD
CUP 1999 data set has the base rate of ≈ 80% and of all the attacks in that dataset
≈ 99% are denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [19]. For a dataset with such characteristics,
the best performance of the Algorithm 1 has been obtained by setting the values of
the parameters to those used in the Example 2. In a real network, one could start with
the parameters of the labelling algorithm obtained in a controlled network scenario
(e.g. with those obtained with the KDD CUP 1999 database) and then fine tune the
parameters over time.
4 Experimental work
Extensive simulation of the basic sensor-assessor structure of a multiple classifier IDS
has been carried out in order to study its response to the attack data. To this end, the
following instance of this structure has been built:
1. In the sensor, the 2-means clustering algorithm has been implemented.
2. Two types of assessors have been tested:
2.1 The assessor implementing the Silhouette index of the clustering and the sil-
houettes of the clusters, according to the Algorithm 1. The global Silhouette
index threshold, ∆S , and the clusters’ silhouette thresholds, ∆S1 and ∆S2 ,
have been used as parameters of the assessing algorithm.
2.2 Cardinality based assessor: the cluster of greater cardinality is considered ”nor-
mal” and is labelled with ’1’. The minimum difference DC between clusters’
cardinalities needed to relabel the clustering is used as a parameter of this as-
sessing algorithm.
Next, an input data source had to be selected. According to [14], this is one of the
challenges of IDS testing. In [14], 4 approaches to this problem are defined, according
to the use of background traffic in the test data:
1. testing using no background traffic at all;
2. testing using real traffic/logs;
3. testing using sanitized traffic/logs;
4. testing by generating traffic on a tested network.
The main advantage of testing by generating traffic artificially is the possibility
of accurate determination of the number of false alarms, since no unknown attacks can
appear in the test data. The quality of such a simulated data source is a separate question.
For example, the well known and widely used KDD CUP 1999 source [3, 11] has been
criticized by various authors (see [13, 20], among others). However, the KDD CUP
data set contains many massive attacks (which is typical for a military environment to
which it corresponds) and this is a decisive characteristic needed for testing the labelling
strategy proposed in this paper.
Thus, we have selected the KDD CUP 1999 database as the traffic source for our
experiments. The aim was to compare the results obtained by applying the two variants
of the proposed labelling strategy, with and without the presence of massive attacks.
Because of that, the attacks from the KDD CUP database were filtered out in the same
way as in [17]. The filtering percentage of 0%, 98% and 99% was used over all the
resource access request records of the database. Without filtering out the attacks (0%),
the database simulates many massive attacks, whereas if the filtering of 98% and 99%
of attacks is applied it simulates a situation in which attacks are rare events. The ef-
fectiveness of the system was measured by means of the ROC (Receiver Operating
Characteristic) curves for the filtered data set mentioned above. A ROC curve depicts
the relationship between false positive rate FPR and true positive rate TPR, where:
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
(7)
a)
b)
c)
Fig. 3 - ROC curves of the IDS. S - labelling using the Silhouette index; C - labelling
using clusters’ cardinalities. Attack filtration: a) 0%, b) 98%, c) 99%
In the equation (7), FP is the number of false positive outcomes of the intrusion
detection on a fixed data set, i.e. the number of decisions in which a non-existing attack
is signalled, TP is the number of true positive outcomes, i.e. successful detections, TN
is the number of true negative outcomes, i.e. the number of decisions, in which a non-
existing attack is not signalled, and FN is the number of false negative outcomes, i.e.
the number of decisions, in which an existing attack is not signalled.
The results concerning the effectiveness of the IDS using the Algorithm 1 are com-
pared with those obtained using the classical cardinality-based labelling. The compar-
ative results are presented in the Fig. 3. The best results with the Algorithm 1 over the
KDD CUP ’99 database were obtained with ∆S1 = ∆S2 = 0.0001.
The ROC curves labelled with S from the Fig. 3 were obtained by setting ∆S1 =
∆S2 = 0.0001 and by varying the global Silhouette index threshold ∆S between 0.6
and 0.9. The cardinality of the data set for clustering was N = 1000 in all the experi-
ments.
From the Fig. 3, it can be seen that without attack filtering (Fig. 3a), the Algo-
rithm 1 gives much better results than the cardinality-based labelling, which is in this
case completely useless. With 98% as well as 99% of the attacks from the KDD CUP
1999 database filtered out (Fig. 3b and 3c, respectively), the results obtained with the
Algorithm 1 are approximately the same as those obtained with the cardinality-based
labelling. This means that the labelling in the presence of massive attacks is solved in
a satisfactory way with the Algorithm 1, whereas the correctness of the IDS decisions
without the presence of massive attacks is not deteriorated.
However, the time complexity of the Silhouette index computation is quadratic in
the number of vectors involved in the clustering. One way of improving the overall
efficiency of an IDS that uses the Silhouette index for labelling is to reduce the number
of processed vectors at a time, N . In that case, the accuracy of the results is deteriorated
to some extent, but the overall efficiency is signifficantly improved.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, a new clusters’ labelling strategy has been proposed for application in a
multiple classifier intrusion detection system (IDS). That strategy combines the com-
putation of the Silhouette clustering quality index and the comparison of silhouettes of
the clusters. The aim of the new labelling algorithm is to detect compact clusters con-
taining very similar vectors that are highly likely to be attack vectors. The response of
an IDS using such a labelling strategy to a massive attack (for example, a Denial-of-
Service attack) was tested. In the experiments, the KDD CUP 1999 database has been
used as the traffic source, in spite of all the criticism, because it is a good source of
massive attacks. It was shown experimentally, via ROC curves obtained by applying
the IDS over the KDD CUP 1999 database, that in the presence of massive attacks the
labelling algorithm that uses the Silhouette index produces much more accurate results
than the one that uses the classical cardinality-based labelling. However, the time com-
plexity of the Silhouette index computation is much greater than the time complexity of
the cardinality-based labelling. The overall performance of a system with the Silhou-
ette index used for labelling may be improved by reducing the number of input vectors
processed at a time, without sacrifising much of the system’s accuracy.
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